


THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin



Vol. XXXVII, No. 948

August 26, 1957

PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST • <i>First Report to Congress on Activities Under the American Doctrine for the Middle East, March 9-June 30, 1957</i> . . . . .	339
SECRETARY DULLES' NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 6 . . . . .	344
DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUPPORTS DOUBLE-TAX TREATY WITH PAKISTAN • <i>Statement by Assistant Secretary Kalijarvi</i> . . . . .	359
THE MIDDLE EAST: AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW • <i>by Edwin M. J. Kretzmann</i> . . . . .	351
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SCIENCE OF HYDROGRAPHY • <i>Article by William G. Watt</i> . . . . .	361

*For index see inside back cover*

SPECIAL  
WEEKLY RECORD  
UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# Bulletin

VOL. XXXVII, No. 948 • PUBLICATION 6534

August 26, 1957

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1955).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

Pro

FI  
FO

PRESI

To the

I am  
the Co  
1957, i  
resolut  
Middle

The  
foreign  
Since i  
tion ha  
with na  
the thr  
more, i  
interna  
gression  
interna  
East w  
and pri

THE W

TEXT C

Chapter

On M  
Joint R  
mote p  
Section  
to the C  
of Janu

<sup>1</sup> H. De

<sup>2</sup> For s  
tary Dull  
25, 1957,

August

## Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East

FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE  
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, MARCH 9-JUNE 30, 1957<sup>1</sup>

### PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am transmitting herewith the first report to the Congress covering activities through June 30, 1957, in furtherance of the purposes of the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.

The resolution is an important milestone in our foreign policy as it relates to the Middle East. Since its approval on March 9, 1957, the resolution has played a major role in our cooperation with nations of the area to build strength against the threat of international communism. Furthermore, it has served as an unmistakable warning to international communism against all forms of aggression. The contribution of the resolution to international peace and stability in the Middle East will continue to grow as long as the purposes and principles it sets forth are maintained.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 31, 1957*

### TEXT OF REPORT

#### Chapter 1. Progress Under the Resolution

On March 9, 1957, the President signed House Joint Resolution 117, which is designed to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> Section 5 of the resolution provides for reports to the Congress by the President in the months of January and July of each year.

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 220, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 5, 1957.

<sup>2</sup> For statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1957, p. 480.

The resolution expresses the readiness of the Government of the United States, speaking through both the legislative and executive branches, to assist nations in the general area of the Middle East to maintain their independence against the threat of international communism. It authorizes certain courses of action designed to assist in promoting the stability, strength, and independence of the nations of the area. It states specifically that United States aid will be extended only to those nations desiring assistance. In making this offer the United States has assumed a new responsibility toward the nations of the Middle East.

A declaration of this type by its very enactment and world recognition of its significance accomplishes an important portion of the purposes behind it. First, international communism has been put on notice regarding the consequences of aggressive action. As Secretary Dulles stated: "It leaves no possibility of miscalculation by potential armed aggressors." Second, the nations of the area are encouraged to help themselves through confidence that they will not be left alone to face overwhelming strength and through the offer of material assistance to supplement their own efforts.

To explain to the countries of the Middle East the implications of the resolution, the President asked Ambassador James P. Richards, who had been appointed on January 7, 1957, as special assistant to the President, to undertake a mission to the area. Ambassador Richards was authorized to make agreements in principle regarding economic and military assistance to further the purposes and objectives of the resolution. Ambassador Richards departed on March 12 for visits to Middle Eastern countries. His party included

responsible officers of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the International Cooperation Administration, and the United States Information Agency. Prior to departure Ambassador Richards declared his readiness to visit any country in the general area of the Middle East wishing to discuss with him this American doctrine. During the ensuing 2 months Ambassador Richards' mission traveled some 30,000 miles and, in response to specific invitations, visited the following 15 nations:

Afghanistan	Turkey
Ethiopia	Yemen
Iran	Sudan
Iraq	Greece
Lebanon	Israel
Libya	Tunisia
Pakistan	Morocco
Saudi Arabia	

Ambassador Richards' mission proved notably successful in bringing home to the nations of the Middle East and to international communism the meaning of the resolution. This is reflected in the fact that 13 of the countries visited have issued public statements endorsing the purposes and objectives of the resolution.<sup>3</sup>

In accordance with powers conferred on him by the President, and in accordance with the provisions of the resolution, Ambassador Richards made agreements in principle for assistance totaling \$118.7 million. Of this amount, \$67.7 million was to assist nations in the development of economic strength; \$51.0 million was to strengthen military forces. Both categories of assistance contribute to the improvement of internal security. Further details on these arrangements and on other use of the authority of the resolution are given in chapter 2 of this report.

Thus, specific and prompt action has been taken. Additional information with respect to the implementation of the resolution and its effects in the Middle East, which must necessarily remain confidential, has been supplied to appropriate committees of the Congress in detailed reports submitted pursuant to section 3 of the resolution. Ambassador Richards and others have testified

before committees of the Congress on the results of his trip and the significance of its accomplishments.<sup>4</sup>

Section 2 of the resolution states that if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations of the Middle East requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism, provided such action is consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The significance of this provision has been its clear warning that the United States would act, and the deterrent effect of this warning. No action has been required under the authority of this provision during the period covered by this report. However, its implications have been carefully brought out. Foreign governments have been assured, notably by Ambassador Richards, that the provision expresses the intent of the United States to come to their help if requested in the event of armed aggression by international communism. At the same time it has been made clear that the resolution specifically confers on the President discretion to determine what action should be taken by the United States in any given circumstances, and that the resolution does not carry with it any advance commitment by the United States to take any particular course of action.

Proper evaluation of a major policy pronouncement can be made only over a period of time. Further, results in terms of achieving United States objectives occur as a consequence of the totality of United States policy, conceived and executed as a synchronized whole. The joint resolution on the Middle East has played a central part in the recent amelioration of the conditions in the area. A fresh opportunity has been opened up for peoples of the area to tackle the manifold matters confronting them.

Despite progress achieved, no grounds for complacency exist. The United States must persevere in the course upon which it has embarked if the high purposes embodied in the resolution are to be realized. To do otherwise would be to break faith with the nations of the Middle East to the

<sup>3</sup> For texts of joint communiques or statements issued following Ambassador Richards' visits, together with other background information, see *ibid.*, May 6, 1957, p. 724; May 13, 1957, p. 763; and May 27, 1957, p. 841.

<sup>4</sup> For Ambassador Richards' statements, see *ibid.*, June 17, 1957, p. 969, and July 1, 1957, p. 17.



detriment of our own national security and the cause of world peace.

In his message of January 5, 1957, to the Congress,<sup>6</sup> the President stated that he intended to request funds for each of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 to carry forward the purposes of the resolution. Funds for this purpose for fiscal year 1958 are included in the appropriate components of the mutual security program currently before the Congress.<sup>6</sup>

## **Chapter 2. Economic and Military Assistance Extended in Furtherance of the Resolution**

In support of its broad objective "to promote peace and stability in the Middle East," the joint resolution authorized the President to extend economic and military assistance to countries in the area from existing appropriations then available for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Section 3 authorized waiver of certain existing provisions of law with respect to not more than \$200 million of the funds available.

The economic and military assistance provisions of the resolution have been particularly important. They have demonstrated the intent of the United States to back up the declaration by prompt, tangible acts. They have carried a powerful psychological impact. Section 3 has enabled the executive branch to make the most effective use of moneys already appropriated. Because of the series of crises in the Middle East during the past fiscal year, a readjustment in previous plans was unavoidable, requiring a waiver of certain restrictions in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1957.

In furtherance of the purposes of the resolution, agreements in principle were negotiated for economic and military assistance totaling \$174.2 million. Somewhat over two-thirds of this amount was negotiated by Ambassador Richards for economic and military assistance in nine of the countries he visited. The remaining one-third represents agreements negotiated by ICA for Middle

East economic programs in support of the objectives of the joint resolution. The appropriate congressional committees have been kept fully informed of all assistance proposed in furtherance of the joint resolution. No substantive objection was received from the committees regarding any of the proposed arrangements.

### *I. Economic assistance agreements negotiated by Ambassador Richards*

Economic assistance programs were approved by Ambassador Richards under the terms of the resolution in the following countries: Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia. In addition, a regional economic assistance program was approved, under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact, involving the cooperation of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Agreement was reached with each country regarding economic projects to be undertaken. Examples of types of economic and technical assistance projects for which funds were committed are the following: Low-cost housing and slum clearance; improvement of municipal village water-supply systems; rural electrification; irrigation projects; road construction and improvement and related facilities; improvement of air-transportation facilities; general economic surveys leading to improved development planning; development of broadcasting; assistance in strengthening education systems; improvement of telecommunications; development of basic industrial facilities and basic resources; improvement of railroad facilities; improved regional telecommunication, railroad, and road systems.

The total amount of economic assistance funds negotiated by Ambassador Richards was \$67.7 million<sup>7</sup> of which \$52.7 million<sup>7</sup> was on a grant basis and \$15 million was on a loan basis. Pursuant to the agreements negotiated by Ambassador Richards, a total of \$47.9 million was ultimately obligated for these purposes. Of this amount, \$23.4 million was obligated under the special authority of section 3 of the resolution, and \$24.5 million was obligated under the regular authority of the Mutual Security Act. The difference be-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1957, p. 83.

<sup>6</sup> For text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress on the mutual security program for 1958, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1957, p. 920.

<sup>7</sup> These amounts were later increased by \$188,000 to \$67.9 million and \$52.9 million, respectively, in order to reflect increased cost in the acquisition of equipment more suitable to the operation involved. [Footnote in original.]

tween the amounts agreed to in principle by Ambassador Richards and the amount of these funds ultimately obligated is accounted for by the fact that certain technical and legal problems could not be resolved before the end of the 1957 fiscal year.

Notification of proposed assistance by countries was given to Congress between the dates of March 29, 1957, and May 14, 1957, on all arrangements made by Ambassador Richards, and in each case included (1) a brief description of the projects, (2) an estimate of costs, and (3) the appropriation expected to be used.

It was made clear to each cooperating country, after agreement in principle had been reached on what economic activities would be carried out, that the United States Government would immediately undertake the legal and technical steps required for the initiation of each project. Furthermore, it was made clear that economic assistance would be furnished from funds appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1957 and that Ambassador Richards was not authorized to make any legal or moral commitments regarding availability of funds for future fiscal years.

## *II. Military assistance agreements negotiated by Ambassador Richards*

Ambassador Richards made agreements in principle for military assistance totaling \$51.0 million,\* consisting principally of additional military hardware (tanks, vehicles, electronics equipment, etc.) expendable items, such as ammunition, and military construction. Of this amount, \$24.1 million was obligated under the regular authority of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and \$23.2 million is estimated to have been obligated under section 3 of the resolution. The exact obligation status of \$7.4 million of the latter amount is not available at this time since the major portion represents items scheduled under offshore procurement on which obligation reports have not yet been received.

A balance of \$3.75 million could not be obligated prior to June 30, 1957, because of legal difficulties. The Department of Defense, however, plans to schedule this amount for obligation early in fiscal year 1958 from such funds as are appropriated by the Congress.

\* This amount was later increased by \$87,000 to \$51.1 million in order to reflect additional items required. [Footnote in original.]

## *III. Use of mutual security funds under the terms of the resolution for Middle East economic assistance programs other than those arranged by Ambassador Richards*

Economic assistance in the amount of \$55.1 million was obligated by ICA for Middle East programs not arranged by Ambassador Richards but which required the authority of section 3 of the joint resolution. Appropriate congressional committees were informed 15 days before funds were obligated. If this authority had not been used most of these Middle East programs could not have been initiated. Types of economic assistance programs covered in this sector are similar to those listed in section I, chapter 2, of this report.

This Middle East economic assistance required use of the authority of the resolution to waive the requirement of section 105 of the 1957 Appropriation Act that not more than 20 percent of fiscal year 1957 funds be obligated after April 30, 1957. This assistance could not be obligated prior to April 30, 1957, because (1) two of the country programs required new bilateral agreements, which were not completed in time to permit orderly programing by April 30, 1957; (2) requirements for orderly and prudent programing precluded earlier obligation of some of the amounts in other country programs; (3) programing needs had undergone considerable change as a result of unforeseen developments in the immediately preceding months; and (4) some of the programs, while not dependent on the Richards mission visits, were deferred pending that mission's visits, to permit assurance of overall program balance. In order to make certain grant assistance available, the authority of the resolution was also used to waive the requirement of the Mutual Security Act that 80 percent of the assistance available under title II of the act be in the form of loans.

## **Chapter 3. Action Pursuant to Section 4**

Section 4 of the resolution states that the President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East with a view to maintaining the peace in that region. This assistance has been rendered.

The United States not only strongly favored the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force by the United Nations General As-

sembly  
the for  
suppor  
Acco  
initial  
way, S  
nesia  
on a n  
lion.  
with a  
on a r  
suppli  
\$2.5 m  
ment o  
The  
as its s  
ment o  
the De  
ternati  
tribute  
million  
eral A  
funds  
ty Act  
This  
Force  
Middle  
Mr. H  
To At  
The  
7 (pre  
ter and  
attend  
eration  
sonal  
with th

\* For

August

sembly in November 1956,<sup>9</sup> but offered to supply the force with initial transportation and logistical support needed to carry out its responsibilities.

Accordingly, the United States has provided initial airlift for 3,657 UNEF troops from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Colombia to Italy and Lebanon on a nonreimbursable basis at a cost of \$1.2 million. The United States has provided the force with a large quantity of supplies and equipment on a reimbursable basis. The cost of these items supplied through the first quarter of 1957 totaled \$2.5 million. Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense have been used in each case.

The United States has already paid \$3.3 million as its share of the United Nations UNEF assessment of \$10.0 million from funds appropriated to the Department of State for contributions to international organizations. It is prepared to contribute on a matching basis one-half of the \$6.5 million of UNEF's 1957 costs for which the General Assembly has requested contributions, using funds under section 401 (b) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended.

This support for the United Nations Emergency Force has helped stabilize the situation in the Middle East in the area of last year's hostilities.

### **Mr. Herter and Ambassador Richards To Attend Malayan Celebrations**

The Department of State announced on August 7 (press release 451) that Under Secretary Herter and Ambassador James P. Richards, who will attend the independence celebrations of the Federation of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur as the personal representatives of President Eisenhower with the rank of special ambassador, will depart

from the United States on August 23 and return on September 22. Their itinerary will also include visits at Manila, Saigon, Rangoon, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, and Tokyo.

They will be accompanied by Mrs. Herter and Mrs. Richards; Frederick M. Dearborn, Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board; Harry F. Stimpson, Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary; John P. White, representative from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; Rufus Z. Smith, Officer-in-Charge, Malayan Affairs; and Mrs. Marian S. Stilson, secretary to the Under Secretary.

### **President of Chile To Visit United States**

White House press release dated August 9

President Eisenhower has invited President Carlos Ibañez del Campo of Chile for a 10-day official visit to the United States beginning December 11, 1957. The first 3 days will be spent in Washington meeting with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and other top officials of the Government. Subsequently, President Ibañez will visit other parts of the United States.

### **Letters of Credence**

#### *Argentina*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Mauricio Luis Yadarola, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on August 5. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 446.

<sup>9</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 787.

## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of August 6

Press release 450 dated August 6

*Secretary Dulles:* I want first of all to say a word about Senator George. I made a statement on Sunday,<sup>1</sup> but I want to say again to you ladies and gentlemen how deeply we feel his loss. I had known him for a good many years rather intimately in the Senate and outside of the Senate. He was a great statesman who contributed greatly to the free world in its search for peace and justice. I don't think it was generally understood perhaps how closely and intimately he had been working with us in the State Department. Since he retired from the Senate, he had been at our staff meetings quite regularly, participated in all our major decisions, and, even after he left Washington for what turned out to be his last trip, I had been in communication with him and had correspondence with him about the foreign policy of the United States. He will be greatly missed, and I will greatly miss him as a close and intimate friend, one who was loved by all who knew him. And I was one who enjoyed that relationship.

I am ready to receive questions.

*Q. There has been grave concern expressed in Britain and also in the dominions that the United States looks happily at trouble in those areas of the Middle East where British oil is concerned in the hope that American oil interests will gradually obtain a greater and greater share in the production of those areas. Would you care to comment on that?*

*A.* In the first place I am not aware of that concern; secondly, I would say there is no basis whatsoever for that concern. It really would be a sad thing if it was felt the United States took pleasure in fomenting trouble in those areas of the world. There is no slightest influence on the part of any American oil company in the direc-

tion which is suggested here. In the particular area of trouble today, between the Sultan of Muscat and the Imam of Oman, the only oil interests in the trouble areas are, as far as I am aware, those of a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company, which reflects a combination of British, American, and other oil interests. There is no desire whatsoever to drive out or make trouble for British interests. There is close cooperation in that respect in that particular area.

*Q. The Imam of Oman is reported to have addressed an appeal to the United States to bring about negotiations between his forces and the British. Can you comment on that?*

*A.* The appeal itself just came to the Department this morning, and I saw it only a few minutes ago. It was a message delivered to our Embassy in Cairo and transmitted by them to the Department. As I said, it just came, to my attention at least, only a few minutes ago. I have not had time to study it. Of course I think you all realize this area has been the scene of recurrent trouble for a long, long time. There have been episodes of this sort with considerable frequency over the last hundred years. I am told there was considerable trouble in 1860 or thereabouts and also considerable trouble in the period of 1912 to 1914. I believe that in 1914 the Imam of Oman addressed a plea to President Wilson, so that this kind of trouble is nothing that is new. It has unhappily been somewhat chronic in the area for a hundred years or thereabouts, and it is our hope that it will not now develop into anything of major proportions.

*Q. Have you any idea, Mr. Secretary, what the Imam of Oman's line of communication is in that very desolate and isolated area—how he communicates with Cairo?*

*A.* No, I can't say. I thought perhaps you peo-

<sup>1</sup> Press release 445 dated Aug. 4.



ple would know better than I, because the report of this communication has been in the press for several days and we only received it this morning.

#### Appointment of Ambassadors

*Q. Several ambassadors—I think perhaps half a dozen or more—have been appointed who are large contributors to the Republican National Committee or similar Republican organizations. I would like to ask two questions: first, are these matters brought to your attention at the time you appoint or recommend the appointment of an ambassador, and secondly, do you clear the appointment of ambassadors with the Republican National Committee?*

*A. The question of contributions is not brought to my attention. I am told that we have appointed more than one ambassador who has made a substantial contribution to the Democratic campaign fund during the last year. So you see that the question of contributions and who the contributions were made to is by no means a determining or important factor in our appointments. I do not think that there is any clearing of appointments except as there is a normal clearing, I think, of all appointments through the leadership. I don't think of anything special with the Republican National Committee. [Addendum: In the case of a noncareer nominee there is usually an effort to get, through the Republican National Committee, political clearance from the State of his residence.]*

*Q. There is, nevertheless, quite an incidence in the appointment of ambassadors of those who have contributed funds, and it leads to a public impression this is a regular practice. I would like to ask you if you think it is a desirable thing to permit that impression to prevail, and, if in the past ambassadors have been appointed because they contributed, perhaps this is a custom which has outlived its usefulness.*

*A. I would be very sorry if there was any rule that because a person contributed to a political campaign fund he was thereby disqualified from being an ambassador. That would deprive us of the services of many important ambassadors, some of whom have contributed to the Democratic Party as well as some who have contributed to the Republican Party. We do not consider con-*

tributing to the Democratic Party disqualifies a person, nor do we consider contributing to the Republican Party disqualifies a person.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said more than one present ambassador has contributed to the Democratic Party. Do you happen to know who they are besides David Bruce, who is listed as a Democratic contributor?*

*A. I think I know who they are, but I prefer not to name them here.*

*Q. On this same subject, Ceylon is considered to be a sensitive area insofar as the competition between the Communist and non-Communist world is concerned. Apart from other considerations was it found that Mr. Gluck had particular qualifications which recommended him to be ambassador there, and, if not, why not?*

*A. Ceylon is of course an important and sensitive area, and indeed I think that every single one of our diplomatic posts represents an important area. I have often said that I think there is not a single one of our diplomatic posts today which does not reflect an area of great importance. It is very different than it was in the old days when there were only three or four really important embassies. Today almost every area is the scene of struggle between international communism and the free world, so that every appointment is important.*

*Now, the question of the selection of any particular person depends primarily upon whether he has integrity of character, whether he has a sharp and quick intelligence, and whether he is genuinely devoted to the public service. We believe that out of those three qualities can be made a competent and efficient ambassador worthy to represent and able to defend the interests of the United States. We believe that Mr. Gluck has all three of those qualities.*

*Q. Are you going to send him to Ceylon, Mr. Secretary?*

*A. I beg your pardon?*

*Q. Is he going to Ceylon?*

*A. I do not know of any change of plans.*

#### Khrushchev-Tito Meeting

*Q. What do you think of the new Khrushchev-Tito treaty, Mr. Secretary?*



A. The meeting is not surprising to us. We have assumed for some time that with the shakeup in the Soviet top leadership, and particularly with the elimination of Mr. Molotov, a new effort would be made to woo Tito. So the fact that the meeting took place came as no surprise; indeed, it was logical it should happen. It is not easy to judge the results of the meeting. Certainly I think that official communiques are not the most informative things in the world even when they are made between the free-world leaders.

*Q. Hear! Hear!*

A. When they are made between the Communists they are even less informative. The things that take place in these meetings which are really significant do not lend themselves to expression in communiques. There is the intangible element and whether you really understand each other and get a better appreciation of what each other's purposes are so they can be brought into harmony. Those things cannot be adequately expressed in communiques. It is interesting that this particular communique, I am told, was not a communique at all in the sense of the usual signed communique, which is customary in these meetings with the Soviet rulers. It was a joint press announcement.

It seems to me quite apparent, as far as we can judge to date, that nothing happened which has led President Tito to give up his rather stalwart position that it is possible to have a Communist regime without being dominated by what we call international communism or a Soviet-type brand of communism. So far we have no reason to believe that there has been any fundamental alteration of the situation. But that can only be adequately judged if we consider what actually happens, and of course we keep this under close and constant scrutiny.

#### **Status of Disarmament Talks**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us something about the status of the disarmament talks in London? Are you optimistic of any possible value of the results?*

A. Well, I try not to operate in terms of optimism or pessimism in this field. As I said several times, it is so important to arrive at a positive result that we have to accept that possibility as a

working hypothesis and we have to keep working day by day plugging along in the faith, at least, that we will come to a positive result. I believe that the proposals made on behalf of the four Western Powers last week—and when I say the four Western Powers I should bring in that they were also concurred in by all of the NATO powers concerned—that represents perhaps the most significant proposal in terms of peace that I think has been made in recent history, perhaps ever.<sup>2</sup> It embodies, of course, the basic concept of President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal made at Geneva 2 years ago. It develops that by accepting the Bulganin proposal that there should also be ground posts, and, indeed, we have come to the conclusion that any effective inspection should have the two components, air inspection and ground posts, and either without the other is inadequate.

Our proposal is now made in alternative terms; it can be very broad, covering in effect all of the North American continent north of Mexico, all of Europe, and all of the Soviet Union; or, if it is desired to start on a more experimental basis, it can be done in the northern area, which would include the area north of the Arctic Circle and, in addition, Alaska, the Aleutians, Eastern Siberia, Kamchatka, and the Kurile Islands.

Now, if we get started in that road, then I believe that we can all feel, with reason, that the danger of a major war has receded because there will not be launched a major war unless the attacker feels that he can gain through surprise a decisive initial advantage.

In that atmosphere it will be possible, indeed inevitable, that we go ahead with reduction of armaments. Without that atmosphere I am dubious as to the possibility of making very much progress because the elements of military strength are so complex, so imponderable, that you cannot equate them in an atmosphere of fear and an atmosphere of danger. That has been proved, I think, particularly by the talks that took place between the allies after the First World War, 8 years of discussions that took place at Geneva.

If, however, there can be sufficient inspection to diminish appreciably the danger of a sudden surprise attack, that will change the atmosphere. Then I think we will really be moving into a new

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1957, p. 303.

era where reduction of armaments will be almost inevitable. It might not even depend upon an agreement but be almost automatic because a potential aggressor will realize that he has no use for his armament because he will not be able to perpetrate a successful aggression, and a peace-loving nation will realize that it does not need so great armament because the nation cannot be knocked out completely by an initial surprise attack. I do believe that, whatever the initial reaction may be, the persuasiveness of such a program is so great that the public opinion in the world will demand its acceptance. With that acceptance then really we shall begin to get somewhere.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what advantage would there be for Russia in signing such an agreement? They know that a democracy can't launch a surprise attack. They are the only kind of government that can. So what kind of arguments could persuade them that this is to their advantage?*

A. Well, I believe that the Soviet rulers want to stand before the world as peace-loving. They talk about it all the time. They realize it is a very important propaganda advantage for them. They have other ways of pursuing their goals than by military aggression. And if they should become exposed to the world as insisting upon an opportunity for massive surprise attack, then I think that their opportunity to perpetrate such attack will vanish and also their opportunity to wage an economic and cultural warfare will vanish with it. So I believe that they will find it to their advantage.

#### **Question of Senate Ratification**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to jump ahead of the game, but, if the Russians should accept the alternative which would open up the United States to inspection, do you have any assurance now or any confidence that the United States Senate would ratify a treaty embracing that fact?*

A. I believe that the peaceful gains from this type of supervision, which would cover all of the Soviet Union and all of the satellite states of Europe, would be so great and so demonstrably great in terms of security, of relief from the danger of sudden surprise attack, of consequent possibilities of saving in terms of budget and the like, that that pressure for the acceptance of such

a proposal would be irresistible upon us, just as it may become irresistible upon the Soviet rulers.

*Q. Have you made soundings in the Senate, either with the Disarmament Subcommittee or the whole Foreign Relations Committee, on the proposals you made in London?*

A. We have kept the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which Senator Hubert Humphrey is chairman, fully informed of what we are doing. I don't want to imply in any way that they are committed by that fact, but they have been kept fully informed. There will be another meeting, I think, of the subcommittee on Thursday, at which Mr. [Gerard C.] Smith, who is my assistant in this matter, will explain further what we did in London. Actually, the text of our proposal was submitted to the subcommittee chairman before it was delivered in London. Let me say again that by that I don't want to imply that we consider the committee bound by any such thing, by acquiescence. But I have no doubt myself that, if this should be accepted by the Soviet Union, it would be supported by the Senate in a treaty.

Of course, I want to make this clear also, that acceptance in principle is a long way off from gaining something that is satisfactory. Before you have anything concrete to put your teeth in here you have to find out what kind of inspection there is going to be. As I said in some of our allied talks in London, we must be very careful to avoid a situation where there is merely an acceptance in principle but without the small print which determines really whether this thing is worth while or not. If the whole world should be elated by what appeared to be an acceptance in principle without working out some of the details, then we might be in for a great disillusion, a great danger. If we started to reduce armaments merely on the basis of a Soviet acceptance in principle before the detailed inspection will be determined, we would have bought a pig in a poke. Therefore, we are urging that the Russians should quickly designate experts with whom we can sit down and start to discuss these questions of what kind of inspection will there be, and upon the kind of inspection, the ability of the inspectors to communicate with their home base upon matters of that sort, we will determine whether there is reality in substance. Indeed, until we get on with

that matter, it is not, I think, in shape to put up in any definitive way to the country, the Congress, or the Senate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you preclude the "open skies" plan as a prerequisite to the other steps that have been talked about—for example, the 10-month ban on nuclear testing, can that go ahead without the "open skies" or not?*

A. Well, we are presenting all of these things as an interlocking whole, and I think it would be extremely difficult to make progress in these other matters if there were rejection of the principle of inspection against a sudden surprise attack.

#### **Effect of Cut in Military Manpower**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during these latter phases of disarmament talks, this administration has announced a considerable cut in its military manpower and its naval ships afloat and reduction in procurement of military aircraft, all for budget reasons. There have been some Democratic critics who have said that this has been unilateral disarmament and in fact has undercut the hand of American diplomacy in these talks with the Soviets. Could you comment on that?*

A. I don't feel that any of the United States cuts that are projected has that effect. It is true that there is a program, for example, to cut our manpower by 100,000. And that would itself bring our manpower closer to the figure we are talking about of two and a half million. But I have never felt, and I think no one else feels really, that these figures of manpower have any very great significance. You can expand or contract manpower very quickly, depending upon what your system of training is. And no reliance, in my opinion, should be placed upon those figures as a reliable index of military power.

The question of the armament is more significant than manpower. But there again I don't think you will ever arrive at any balancing equation. But the U.S. manpower cuts that are now in contemplation are not designed really to cut our strength.

I would feel this, that, if there was action taken in relation to our mutual security program which looked as though our system of mutual security would fall apart, that would be extremely disastrous from the standpoint of negotiating an

effective limitation of armament agreement and inspection agreement because then indeed the Soviets might say, "Well, all we need to do is to wait and the whole collective security, common-defense system of the free nations will fall apart." If they had that prospect before them, I think they would just try to wait that one out.

But the cuts so far in contemplation in our own National Military Establishment are not designed to, and will not actually, cut our military strength. It will change the form of it, but we will still have an immensely powerful Military Establishment.

#### **Aerial Inspection of U.S. Overseas Bases**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the relationship between the United States system of overseas bases and the proposal for aerial inspection in its various forms? This question has come up before, and there has been some speculation from London that it may be raised again by the Soviets.*

A. Well, if the Soviet Union accepts the proposal for the large areas, that would cover a very considerable part of the areas of our bases. Even the northern proposal, of course, covers the Thule base in Greenland. And the broad European proposal would cover the United Kingdom and virtually all of Europe, including parts of Spain where some at least of our bases are—in Turkey, and so forth. The fact that these areas are under inspection does not mean that there will not be bases there. As a matter of fact, I would imagine that today the Soviet Union, through its agents and through the fact that we are pretty loose in our security precautions, has got pretty full knowledge today about our bases and our military establishments, both here and abroad. Probably they would not learn a great deal more under this system than they know now. And it would not lead to any alteration in our military dispositions.

*Q. What about the possibility of—well, let me put it this way—would it be a negotiable question to consider applying the inspection procedures to bases in the Middle East?*

A. Well, we have no bases in the Middle East [addendum: excluding North Africa] unless you include Turkey, and that would be covered in this plan, I presume.

*Q. Dhahran?*

A. That is not a military base.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, don't you think that—*

*A. Excuse me. We have certain rights there, but we do not—but that is not operated as a military base.*

#### **Import Restrictions on Lead and Zinc**

*Q. Sir, do you think that our position on liberal trade at the forthcoming Buenos Aires conference will at all be weakened by the Department's support of new lead and zinc restrictions? <sup>a</sup> I understand that several Latin American countries who are economically dependent on lead and zinc exports have already protested to the Department on the matter.*

*A. I think it's unfortunate that the situation in the lead and zinc industry here at home is such that it does seem necessary to take certain measures to protect it and keep it in existence as a healthy industry. I do not think that that means, in fact I'm sure that it does not mean, any basic change in the attitude of this administration toward trade and our desire to have a liberal flow of trade to mutual advantage. There are always going to be special situations that come along and which as a practical matter have to be dealt with. And the fact that there are exceptions does not in any way vitiate the rule of seeking to have free and liberal trade.*

*Now, this situation about lead and zinc has been one that has been plaguing us for several years. It came up rather acutely about 4 years ago, I think in '53, and at that time it was possible to handle the situation through a combination of voluntary restraints by some foreign countries on their exports of lead and zinc to the United States and stockpiling program. Well, the stockpiling program has come to an end. The price of most metals is rather weak at the present time, and the situation is back to be dealt with in some way. The program for dealing with it, as I understand, is on a sliding-scale basis, so that, when prices recover, then the duties will go down. We can all hope that there will be a revival of strength in these metals so that in fact any new duties based only upon low prices will not have to be maintained.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what's delaying the firming up of a date for the special Assembly session on*

*Hungary, and are Yugoslavia and Ceylon among those favoring such a special session?*

*A. I thought that there had been agreement on the special session.*

*Q. No.*

*A. Well, then I was misinformed. I had a long talk on the telephone on Sunday, when I got back, with Ambassador Lodge, and he gave me the date and he seemed to think it was reasonably firm.*

*Q. What date was that, Mr. Secretary?*

*A. It was, I think, just a week before the opening of the regular General Assembly, which I think is the 17th, is it not? And he assumed that there would be a special session, I think, on the 10th.*

*Q. During your stay in London, Mr. Secretary, did the French seek to divert you at all on the subject of Algeria when you talked about it?*

*A. I don't know in what sense you use the word "divert."*

*Q. You went over to talk about disarmament and, since the French Foreign Minister was in London, I wonder if you talked about Algeria.*

*A. Foreign Minister Pineau came over to London while I was there and he had lunch with me at the Embassy, and before lunch we strolled around on the lawn and talked about various matters and Algeria was one of the topics that was mentioned, but I might say in a semisocial way.*

*Q. Did you talk about the NATO atomic stockpile matter that you mentioned to us some weeks ago, and what is the status of the Pentagon agency report on that, which you said was forthcoming?*

*A. I have not caught up with that since I am back. We did not discuss it in London, no.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had time to look into Ambassador Smith's report and the statements he made on the Cuban situation?*

*A. Yes, I read the statement, and I want to say that it is a statement which, perhaps from a purely technical point of view, may not have been perfectly correct. But it was a very human statement. I'm glad that we have some, in fact I hope many, ambassadors who are not mere automatic machines but who do have sentiments of humanity which they sometimes express, without regard perhaps to the diplomatic niceties. His statement*

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 321.



was a very well-balanced statement, and he made it because he felt that he had become involved in, and had been a cause of, the trouble. He regretted, on the one hand, that his visit had been used to stage demonstrations, and he regretted, on the other hand, that the restraining of those demonstrations had involved certain, what he regarded as, police brutalities. And a person of flesh and blood and heart would, I think, under the circumstances of the case, have made the kind of a statement that he did. I'm confident that, even if it was in certain technical respects perhaps not correct, there will be an understanding of it on the part of the authorities in Cuba because it was a very human thing to do and, as I say, we want our ambassadors to be human people.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the Department's view of the political situation in Cuba now, in view of this?*

A. If I should comment on that, I would be a lot worse than Mr. Smith.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## United States and Japan Establish Committee on Security

U.S. Embassy (Tokyo) press release dated August 6

The Governments of the United States and Japan agreed on August 6 on the arrangements for the intergovernmental committee which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan agreed to establish in their joint communique of June 21, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

The committee is to be called the "Japanese-American Committee on Security."

For the United States Government the members will be the United States Ambassador, Douglas MacArthur II, who will serve as Chairman of the United States representation; and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Adm. Felix B. Stump, who will be the Ambassador's principal

adviser on military defense matters. The Commander, United States Forces, Japan, Lt. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., will serve as Admiral Stump's alternate.

For the Japanese Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aichihiro Fujiyama, and the Director General of the Defense Agency, Juichi Tsushima, will be members of the committee. Other Cabinet Ministers concerned may participate as members when deemed necessary. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will preside on the Japanese side.

The committee will meet whenever requested by either side. Arrangements for the meetings of the committee, which will take place in Tokyo, will be made by the American Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Matters to be discussed by the committee will include the three points mentioned in the joint communique of June 21, 1957, namely:

A. Study of problems arising in relation to the security treaty, including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces;

B. Consultation to assure that any action taken under the treaty conforms to the principles of the United Nations Charter; and

C. Consideration of future adjustments in the relationships between the United States and Japan in these fields adequate to meet the needs and aspirations of the peoples of both countries.

The deliberations of the committee will include any matters underlying and related to security affairs which would serve to promote understanding between the two Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations between the two countries in the field of security.

The committee is to be consultative in nature. Any action resulting from the deliberations of the committee will be taken by the two Governments in accordance with their normal procedures.

The committee will hold its first meeting in the near future.

<sup>1</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1957, p. 51.



## The Middle East: An American Point of View

by Edwin M. J. Kretzmann<sup>1</sup>

A speech about the Middle East usually stresses the vital strategic interest of the United States and the free world in the area. This is as it should be, because we think first in terms of national security. Events of the past 6 months have vividly demonstrated the validity of this interest. The closure of the Suez Canal had economic and political repercussions throughout the world. It has resulted in intensified efforts to develop alternatives.

The interruption in the flow of Middle Eastern oil, essential to the economic progress and military security of Western Europe and also to the economic well-being of the Arab States, showed the need for friendly, cooperative relations with the Middle East. The strain which was placed upon our own oil resources to make up for this temporary shortfall in Europe's supply brought home to the United States the importance to our own security of maintaining peaceful conditions in the Middle East. In short, economic dependence on the Middle East for resources and for smoothly functioning trade routes between Europe and the areas of South Asia has given us a demonstration of the need for, and recognition of, interdependence of the free world.

The concept of interdependence, however, implies a recognition of interests and benefits on both sides. In the area of the Middle East we are fortunate in having a large area of agreement of interests between the countries of that area and the rest of the free world. Essentially, they want what we want. The leaders of the Middle

Eastern countries are recognizing to a growing extent that the vast resources underneath their sands are capable of exploitation and of profitable trade only in cooperative efforts with the more technically advanced countries of the free world. They are also aware that the arteries of trade which pass through and over their territory are a means of profitable interchange of goods contributing to the general welfare from which they are prime beneficiaries.

It is quite natural that the American people have directed their attention to the preservation of our own and the free world's security and the furtherance of our national interests in our relations with the Middle East countries. I do not pretend to be an expert in this area of the world, but I would like to look at the reverse of this coin for a moment. I shall attempt to sketch for you a composite picture of the attitudes and viewpoints of the leaders and peoples of the area toward the questions which are of mutual concern to us and to them. I hope that in so doing the mutuality of our interests will become more apparent and that some substance will be given to the concept of interdependence in our relations with the Middle East.

### Middle East Attitude Toward Communism

The attitude of the Middle East countries toward communism does not differ essentially from our own. They reject it. They reject it as a system of social, economic, and political dogma which would enable them to realize their national destiny. They reject it for reasons inherent in their own social and religious traditions. Communism as an atheistic, materialistic approach to life is incompatible with the great spiritual tra-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Southern Federation of Syrian Lebanese American Clubs at Dallas, Tex., on July 7. Mr. Kretzmann is public affairs adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

ditions of Islam and of Judaism, as well as with Christianity. But the peoples of the area have had only limited contacts with or knowledge of the Communist system in actual operation. Absorbed as they are in their own intense desire for political and economic development, they pay less attention than we do to events in other parts of the world, such as in Hungary, which serve to demonstrate the inability of a country to free itself of the shackles of communism once they have been imposed.

The absorbing passion of all of the leaders in the area is to achieve their national destiny by the full exercise of political sovereignty and of the right to economic development for their people. They have come to recognize that in this great effort they now need, and will need for some time to come, the support of other nations which have developed their industry and agriculture. In their search for a helping hand to enable them to reach these objectives they have not been inclined to look too closely at the future involvement which might be the price for such assistance. In fact, in their eagerness to achieve immediate help and in the first flush of their own political independence, they have been inclined to brush aside the potential future danger of Communist domination as an inescapable result of Soviet assistance. Fortunately this attitude is declining and the leaders are becoming increasingly aware of the danger of involvement with international communism.

Next to their desire to realize as fully and as rapidly as possible their political independence, the leaders of the area are determined to provide economic and social improvement for their people. Here again we note an increasing realization that the best prospects for profitable future economic cooperation on a basis of equality lie with the free world. Despite the emotionalism which occasionally seems to characterize political reactions in this part of the world, I am convinced that the hard-headed realism of the leaders of these states will enable them to see that the best possibility of realizing their national destiny lies in continued cooperation with the Western countries.

This approach is especially clear in their attitude toward the United States. There is a tremendous reservoir of good will toward the United States and Americans in general, created by a century-long tradition of American educational, philanthropic, and business activities within the area.

The very existence of this and similar organizations throughout the United States is proof of this continuing link. Added to this are the enormous prestige which the President enjoys throughout the area and the newly won admiration for the policies of the United States which followed the events of last fall. It would be idle for me to deny that there is much criticism of some of the policies we have pursued in the area, but it is comforting to note that the leaders do not hesitate to criticize and discuss these policies frankly with us in a manner which is strongly reminiscent of our own traditions of airing political differences within our own country. But this reputation which we have achieved and which we still enjoy carries with it a great responsibility of continuing to act with wisdom and justice toward the intra-area disputes which agitate the governments.

#### **American Doctrine for the Middle East**

All of these considerations come to a focus in the attitudes of these people toward the American Doctrine for the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> To the leaders of the area this seemed a very promising step on the part of the United States toward placing its relations with the area on a basis of complete equality. In their discussions with Ambassador Richards during his recent trip to 15 of these countries the leaders in the Middle East were testing and probing our intentions, and I think that on the whole they came up with a judgment that the United States fully recognized their own right to full sovereignty and to free self-development. At the same time it became clear to them, I believe, that there were certain common aspects to their problems which required them to think of the area as a whole and its role in the larger picture of international relations. We have the impression also that the leaders were beginning to admit that failure to settle intra-area problems continues to provide opportunities for outside nations to exploit these differences for their own power purposes.

The objectives of the United States in the Middle East can be briefly stated and are ones which in our view can be freely shared by the members of the free-world community, including the states of the Middle East themselves. In our own interests and the interests of free-world se-

<sup>2</sup> For a report by President Eisenhower, see p. 339.

curit  
aimed  
The  
defe  
velo  
peac  
assis  
the  
peop  
with  
If  
even  
anot  
coro  
the  
retar  
cept  
man  
exerc  
the  
sake  
In  
vised  
think  
our  
in th  
word  
taken  
as a  
Trip  
that  
woul  
alter  
polic  
Octo  
the  
defau  
Work  
It  
atten  
tions  
Unit  
who  
mem  
respo  
the  
terest  
result

"Fo

Augu

curity, United States policy in the Middle East is aimed at achieving three things:

The first is stability through adequate national defense and internal security, plus economic development. The second objective is to establish peace with justice in the area. And the third is to assist in creating conditions which would permit the cultural and religious development of the peoples in the area so that a fruitful interchange with the rest of the free world might ensue.

If the above three objectives can be achieved or even for the present be encouraged, we feel that another objective will be an inevitable and welcome corollary. This would constitute an approach to the goal of interdependence as set forth by Secretary Dulles on a number of occasions. This concept comprehends the exercise of sovereignty in a manner which realizes the national self-interest by exercising the most sovereign of sovereign rights—the denial of extreme national self-interest for the sake of the common good.

In pursuit of the above objectives we have devised a number of different policies. By now I think it has been made abundantly clear that it is our policy to seek settlement of outstanding issues in the area through peaceful means, in other words, through negotiation. Conversely, we have taken a strong position against the use of force as a means to alter existing arrangements. The Tripartite Declaration of May 1950<sup>a</sup> made it clear that we, together with the British and French, would take action to oppose any forcible efforts at altering the Armistice Agreements of 1949. This policy was put to a severe test in the events of October–November 1956, but we took our case to the United Nations when the French and British defaulted, and we carried out our commitment.

#### **Working Through the United Nations**

It is also a fixed policy of your Government to attempt to work out peaceful and equitable solutions to the disputes within the area through the United Nations. In our judgment the countries who are parties to these disputes are responsible members of the international community who are responsive to the moral opinions of mankind. In the United Nations the conflicting national interests can, and do, receive a full hearing, and the resultant verdict of partisan and nonpartisan

opinion may, and often does, succeed in modifying conflicting views to a point where an acceptable compromise becomes possible. This does not constitute an abdication of power and responsibility to the United Nations but an exercise of that power and responsibility in the most responsible manner.

Let me illustrate this point by an example in contrast. The Soviet Union met its issue with Hungary last October by the application of naked, unilateral power, not only refusing the offer of United Nations mediation but savagely rejecting it. But the issue is not settled. What the Soviets call a settlement is certainly not accepted by the Hungarians. If reports are correct, it is not accepted by the satellite peoples, and even in Russia there is said to be criticism. Certainly no one in the free world considers this a settlement, and Soviet loss of prestige and moral isolation are only part of the reward they deserved.

By contrast I would point to our continuing efforts to find an acceptable solution to the Suez Canal problem. President Nasser precipitated the crisis of last fall by his action in nationalizing the Canal Company. It was certainly true that British and French national interests were threatened when management of the canal was transferred to hands they felt they could not trust. It is equally true that President Nasser placed his seizure of the Canal Company in a context that engaged the political prestige of the Western powers in the issue and resulted in position-taking which virtually excluded retreat or compromise on either side. Amid this turmoil of recrimination and fulmination the basic importance of the canal as a vital link in the interdependence of Europe and Asia and as a means of keeping the Middle East within the free world where its vital self-interests lie became obscured. More importantly, this controversy, with its crescendo of actions and reactions, was furnishing the Soviets with a golden opportunity to enter into the issue with threats of volunteers and atomic retaliation in the hope of reaping political rewards from irresponsible support of extremist demands. These were the real issues, the real dangers, on which we attempted to keep our attention focused in an effort to best preserve our own national interests, the interests of free-world security, and the real welfare of the Middle Eastern countries.

And finally, to deal with the threat to the area

<sup>a</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 834.

as a whole from the aggressive designs of international communism, we devised the American Doctrine for the Middle East, popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. It had become increasingly evident during the events of last fall that, as long as the Soviet Union could intervene in the Middle East in an irresponsible manner to support extremist demands, the solution of intra-area problems, so necessary to producing stability and cooperation, would remain impossible. The American Doctrine for the Middle East was designed, like the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, like the Formosa resolution and our treaties with Korea and Viet-Nam, to place limits upon Soviet intervention, both overt and covert, by spreading a shield of protection over the area as a whole. If necessary, we are prepared to use United States troops to prevent overt Soviet attack, and, by means of economic and military assistance to those states which desire it, we are prepared to strengthen the economies and internal security of the cooperating states to place limits on Soviet efforts to create chaos and prevent settlements.

In our judgment the major threat to the Middle East is represented by the forces of international communism, and we feel deeply that we must never lose sight of this danger. The United States has a vital stake in keeping the Middle East from falling under Soviet domination or in not allowing the situation there to deteriorate to a point where the nations of the area in desperation would turn to the Soviet Union for help. We must not permit our concern for the disputes within the area to influence our exercise of great and grave responsibility as a leader of the free-world nations or to color the sense of justice and friendly impartiality which is so deeply rooted in the traditions of the American people.

### **Air Agreement With Egypt Modified**

Press release 447 dated August 5

A modification of the 1946 air transport agreement between the United States and Egypt<sup>1</sup> was announced in Cairo on August 3 following an exchange of diplomatic notes between the American Embassy at Cairo and the Egyptian Government.

The exchange of notes provides for inclusion

<sup>1</sup> 61 Stat. (4) 3825.

in section 1 of the route annex to the agreement of a new subparagraph (d) authorizing service by U.S. airlines to Egypt via Ireland, the United Kingdom, Germany, and intermediate points.

The agreement with Egypt authorizes services over routings which proceed from the United States to Egypt via France and intermediate points as well as via Portugal and intermediate points. However, no provision was previously made for a service routed to Egypt via the United Kingdom and Germany. Trans World Airlines is the U.S. carrier certified by the Civil Aeronautics Board to operate services through Egypt. The air transport agreement provides that a route to the United States to be operated by Egyptian airlines may be determined at a later date.

### **Research Fellowships Offered Under SEATO Cultural Program**

Press release 448 dated August 6

As a part of its program of cultural relations, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is offering research fellowships to nationals of the member countries. For the first year of this program a limited number of grants will be awarded for research primarily in SEATO countries within the treaty area. The object of the fellowship program now being inaugurated is to encourage the study and research (preferably leading to publication) of such social, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and educational problems as give insight into the present needs and future development of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific viewed against a background of SEATO objectives.

The grants will be for a period of 4 to 10 months. They provide for a monthly allowance of \$400 (or its equivalent in other currency) and tourist-class round-trip travel by air to the country or countries where the research is to be undertaken. Recipients of grants will be required to submit a study on the subject of their research. Candidates will be selected on the basis of their special aptitude and experience for carrying through a major project of research. Professional experience and published material as well as academic qualifications will be taken into consideration. Applications should be addressed to the appropriate national authority not later than



October 15, 1957. It is expected that awards will be announced by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in December.

United States citizens should direct inquiries to and request application forms from the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington 25, D.C. This organization is assisting the Department of State in the initial screening of applications. Final selection of candidates for awards will be made by an international committee at SEATO headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand.

### **World Bank Loan to Japan for Aichi Irrigation Project**

The World Bank announced on August 9 that it had that day made a loan equivalent to \$7 million to assist in the execution of a multipurpose program for irrigation, water supply, and power in the Aichi region of central Japan. The program will make it possible to increase the production of food crops by about 200,000 tons annually. In addition it will supply drinking water to numerous towns and villages, provide more water for industry in three cities, including Nagoya, Japan's third most important industrial city, and increase the power supply of the region.

The First National City Bank of New York is participating in the loan, without the World Bank's guaranty, to the extent of \$721,000. This amount represents the first five maturities of the loan, which fall due semiannually beginning on November 1, 1961.

The most important feature of the program will be the perennial irrigation of 42,000 acres of land already under paddy and of 40,000 acres of upland areas. This will be Japan's first attempt to irrigate ridgelands. The experience gained in the Aichi region will demonstrate the feasibility of using the same techniques on very much larger areas of similar land in southern Japan. If this is possible, the development at Aichi will have made a more significant contribution toward improving Japan's food supply. To feed its population of 90 million, Japan now has annual food imports costing the equivalent of \$600 million in foreign exchange. With the population in-

creasing by 1 million a year, the food deficit will be much greater unless domestic production can be increased.

The loan was made to the Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation, a Government agency formed in October 1955 to plan and execute the project. The project is expected to take 4 years to complete at a total cost equivalent to about \$100 million. The bank's loan will pay for the importation of heavy machinery for the construction of a dam, canals, and reservoirs; services of irrigation and construction consultants; and the training abroad of a few key personnel in the techniques of ridge-land irrigation.

The main features of the Aichi program are the construction of a dam at Makio Bridge on the Otaki River and regulating reservoirs capable of impounding 117 million cubic yards of water; a 10,000-kilowatt electric power plant; a 68-mile (114 km.) main canal running southward along the ridge of the Chita Peninsula to its end; about 780 miles (1,300 kms.) of secondary canals; ditches or sprinkler-irrigation mains at the discharge points of the secondary canals to bring water to between 20,000 and 30,000 farms; and canals to bring water to municipalities for domestic and industrial use.

The Aichi Corporation will build the dam, reservoirs, and canals. The works required to bring irrigation water to the farms will be built and operated by the Association of Farmers in the region, the work required to supply drinking and industrial water to the municipalities will be done by the Aichi Prefecture, and the electric power plant will be built by the Kansai Electric Power Company. The Aichi Corporation will lend funds to Kansai and the Prefecture to help finance the works to be carried out by them.

Most of the farms to be irrigated already exist, but new farms will be established on land not now occupied. Many paddy fields in the Aichi area must now be used in winter to store water, but with irrigation these will be available for growing winter vegetables and cereals. On the ridgelands, increased production will come from a wider cropping pattern and from higher yields of crops now damaged by severe drought in late summer.

Paddy rice farming is an old and highly developed skill in Japan, and the paddy farmers should have no difficulty obtaining maximum benefit from the project almost immediately. The



rapidity with which farmers can master the intricacies of irrigation on rolling ridgeland is more difficult to predict as this is a new kind of agriculture in Japan. However, Japanese farmers are renowned for their competence and diligence and can be expected to obtain maximum yields after experience is gained in applying water under these conditions. They will receive guidance in acquiring the necessary skills from the results of research being carried out by the Government.

The bank's loan is for a term of 20 years and bears interest of 5¾ percent annually, including the 1 percent commission which is allocated to the bank's special reserve. Amortization will begin November 1, 1961. The loan is guaranteed by the Government of Japan.

The bank has now made eight loans totaling the equivalent of \$83 million in Japan. One of the previous loans was for a land reclamation project also designed to increase agricultural production. The others were for electric power development, steel production, and various other industries.

After having been approved by the bank's Executive Directors, the loan documents were signed by Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, on behalf of the Government of Japan, by Katsuhiko Hamaguchi, president, for the Aichi Irrigation Public Corporation, and by Eugene R. Black, president, for the World Bank.

### **United States and Brazil Sign Power Reactor Agreement**

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State announced on July 31 (press release 440) that the Governments of the United States and Brazil on that day signed an agreement on the civil uses of atomic energy which authorizes United States assistance to Brazil in developing a nuclear power program. This agreement provides that the United States will make available as needed, for a term of 20 years, 550 kilograms of uranium 235 to be contained in fuel leased or sold to Brazil for its reactors.

The agreement was signed for the United States by Assistant Secretary Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., and Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and for Brazil by Ambassador Ernani do Amaral Peixoto.

The National Nuclear Energy Commission for Brazil, headed by Adm. Octacilio Cunha, will supervise arrangements for the fueling of the 11,500-kilowatt (electrical) nuclear plant, which will be erected at a site as yet undetermined. The reactor will be of the boiling-water type.

The agreement will enlarge the areas of cooperation between the United States and Brazil in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It will authorize, for example, the sale of gram quantities of special materials for laboratory use and, in the event that Brazil decides to build a material-testing reactor, the designation of 6 kilograms of reactor fuel at a 90 percent enrichment in U-235. Notes exchanged in connection with the signing of this agreement provide for its future amendment to increase the quantities of fuel should Brazil develop additional atomic power projects.

This agreement is the second between the United States and Brazil embracing peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The existing research agreement has been in effect since August 1955.<sup>1</sup> Under it, Brazil has moved forward in a research reactor program. The 5-megawatt (thermal) pool reactor is expected to be in operation within 3 or 4 months. It will be located at the University of São Paulo. Fuel elements for this reactor are scheduled for shipment to Brazil early in August. On April 20, 1956, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission approved a grant of \$350,000 toward the cost of this nuclear research facility.

Upwards of 500 shipments of radioisotopes have been sent to Brazil. Brazilian scientists and technicians have taken special training courses at the International School for Nuclear Science and Engineering at the Argonne National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and also at the Phoenix atomic project at the University of Michigan.

Brazil assumed a vital role in the work that resulted in the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Dr. João Carlos Muniz was president of the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA last fall, and Minister Carlos A. Bernardes heads the Preparatory Commission which is preparing for the operations of the IAEA. In addition, Brazil participated in the Inter-American Symposium at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in May 1957 and is one of the

<sup>1</sup>Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3303.

seven countries represented on the United Nations Advisory Committee which planned the 1955 Atomic Energy Conference at Geneva and is now at work on a similar conference scheduled for September 1958.

## **Italy and World Bank To Sponsor Nuclear Power Study**

The World Bank announced on August 2 that the Government of Italy and the bank have agreed to cooperate in sponsoring a study which will lead to the construction of a large nuclear power station in southern Italy.

In announcing the agreement, the Italian Government said that it greatly welcomed the cooperation of the bank in the joint study. The Government had already announced a decision that a large nuclear power station would be built in the south of Italy by the Societa Elettronucleare Nazionale. The Societa is a company whose principal shareholders consist of all the major electric power companies in southern Italy together with a number of Government-controlled metallurgical and engineering corporations.

Eugene R. Black, president of the World Bank, said that the study was proposed to the Italian Government by the bank because Italy is a country where relatively high conventional fuel costs and the rising demands for electric energy appeared to be favorable to the early commercial use of nuclear power.

The bank has already invested more than \$1 billion in power projects around the world, Mr. Black said, and the cooperative study of a nuclear power plant in southern Italy will point the way to bank lending operations in this new and challenging field. The study will therefore be of importance both for Italy and for other bank member countries.

The study will be known as Project E.N.S.I. (Energia Nucleare sud Italia) and will include the following steps:

- (a) The selection of a site for a nuclear power station;
- (b) The preparation of invitations to qualified manufacturers on an international basis to tender for a nuclear plant of approximately 150,000 kilowatts electric capacity at the proposed site;
- (c) A review of the tenders submitted and the

preparation of an evaluation of them, particularly regarding comparative cost and performance.

The executive responsibility for Italian participation in the project has been given by the Government to the Comitato Nazionale per le Ricerche Nucleari, the official institution responsible for nuclear research and development in Italy. The general secretary of the Comitato, Felice Ippolito, and Corbin Allardice, adviser on atomic energy to the World Bank, will together make up the steering committee which will be responsible for overall direction of the project.

The U.K. Atomic Energy Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have agreed to provide nuclear engineering consultation to the project. Tenders received from manufacturers will, in the case of gas-cooled natural uranium reactors, be technically reviewed by the Authority. In the case of enriched uranium systems, the Commission will arrange for technical review of each tender.

The World Bank will set up an international panel of recognized specialists in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear engineering to give general guidance to the project and also to review tenders and the reports on them provided by the U.K. Authority, the U.S. Commission, and the staff of the project. The panel will have a Canadian as chairman and will also include one Frenchman, one Italian, two U.K. nationals, and two Americans. The panel will in its turn transmit its reports to Societa Elettronucleare Nazionale, which will select the most suitable tender for the construction of the new nuclear power station.

## **Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Butterfat Articles**

White House press release dated August 7

### **WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT**

The President has issued a proclamation prohibiting further imports of articles containing 45 percent or more of butterfat, except articles already subject to quotas, cheeses, evaporated and condensed milk, and products imported in retail packages.

In issuing this proclamation, the President ac-

cepted the recommendation of the United States Tariff Commission. At the same time the President requested the Secretary of Agriculture to maintain surveillance upon imports of butterfat articles not subject to quota with a view to recommending appropriate action if any such imports increase and threaten material interference with established agricultural programs.

The President's action was based on a report of the United States Tariff Commission.<sup>1</sup> The Commission's investigation and report were made under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes limitations on imports when imports are interfering with or threatening to interfere with domestic price-support or marketing programs.

### PROCLAMATION 3193<sup>2</sup>

#### IMPOSING IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN ARTICLES CONTAINING BUTTERFAT

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U. S. C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised me there was reason to believe that certain articles containing butterfat, the butterfat content of which is commercially extractable, or which are capable of being used for any edible purpose for which products containing butterfat are used, are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to milk and butterfat, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk and butterfat with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken;

WHEREAS, on May 21, 1957, under the authority of the said section 22, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation with respect to this matter;<sup>3</sup>

WHEREAS, in accordance with the said section 22, as implemented by Executive Order No. 7233 of November 23, 1935, the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation and has reported to me its findings and recommendations made in connection therewith;

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the said Tariff Commission, I find that the articles with respect to which import restrictions are hereinafter proclaimed are being or are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to materially interfere

with the said price-support program with respect to milk and butterfat, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk and butterfat with respect to which said price-support program is being undertaken;

WHEREAS I find and declare that the import restrictions hereinafter proclaimed are shown by such investigation of the said Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of the said articles will not materially interfere with the said price-support program or reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic milk and butterfat with respect to which the said price-support program is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS I find that there is no representative period, within the meaning of the first proviso to subsection (b) of the said section 22, for imports of the said articles:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said section 22, do hereby proclaim that, effective at the close of business August 7, 1957 and thereafter, articles containing 45 percent or more of butterfat or of butterfat and other fat or oil, the butterfat content of which is commercially extractable, or which are capable of being used for any edible purpose for which products containing butterfat are used, shall not be permitted to be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption: *Provided*, That this limitation shall not apply to the following articles:

1. Articles the importation of which is restricted under quotas established pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.
2. Cheeses the importation of which is not restricted by quotas established pursuant to the said section 22.
3. Evaporated milk and condensed milk.
4. Products imported packaged for distribution in the retail trade and ready for use by the purchaser at retail for an edible purpose or in the preparation of an edible article.
5. Articles containing butterfat and other fat or oil, if the importer establishes to the satisfaction of the collector of customs that the butterfat content thereof is less than 45 percent.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 7th day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
Secretary of State.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

<sup>2</sup> 22 Fed. Reg. 6395.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of July 1, 1957, p. 33.

## THE CONGRESS

### Department of State Supports Double-Tax Treaty With Pakistan

*Statement by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi  
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to have this opportunity to present to your committee the views of the Department of State on the double-tax treaty with Pakistan. This treaty was signed recently on the occasion of the visit paid to this country by the Minister of Finance of Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

I shall address myself particularly to the so-called tax-sparing provision of the treaty, under which we undertake to give credit for certain income taxes waived by Pakistan as an incentive to new industries; and I should like to give you a brief outline of the economic-policy reasons that have led the State Department to give its full support to this new departure in our treaty policy.

As the committee is aware, treaties for the avoidance of double taxation are among the principal instruments through which governments create a favorable atmosphere for foreign trade and investment. Double-tax treaties accomplish far more in this respect than a point-by-point analysis of their individual provisions would suggest. They bring about a broad overall adjustment of two tax systems in such a way that movements of trade and investment between the two countries are facilitated and that conflicts of tax policy are greatly reduced or even eliminated. The State Department, which is responsible for the implementation of our treaty policy, considers it an important feature of our foreign economic relations that we now have double-tax treaties with 19 foreign countries which place economic relations with these countries under a clear and consistent tax regime.

The Department of State has, however, been much concerned about the fact that we have tax

treaties almost exclusively with the countries of Western Europe and with other highly developed countries; e. g., Canada, Australia, and Japan. We have only one treaty with a Latin American country, and we have no double-tax treaties at all with underdeveloped countries elsewhere. This situation is the more unfortunate since the flow of private investment to underdeveloped countries must play an important role in their economic development. We are committing very large public resources to the strengthening of many of these countries. I need not expand on this theme before this committee beyond saying that our treaty program as well as our economic-aid program and all other aspects of our foreign economic policy should encourage a maximum of private participation in the development of underdeveloped areas.

The reason that our tax treaties have so far contributed little to this goal is that many of their standard provisions assume a mutual flow of trade, capital, and investment income which normally exists only between countries on a comparable level of economic development. Where levels of economic development are not comparable, the flow of capital is likely to be entirely from the more developed country to the less developed country; and investment income flows in the opposite direction, from the less developed to the more developed country. This leads to peculiar results under our tax treaties. Many of the standard clauses of these treaties provide, e. g., that certain types of investment income be exempted from taxation by the country in which the income originates and be taxed only in the recipient country. That is fair enough when such income flows both ways. But it means that an underdeveloped country has to give up revenue without receiving any revenue in return, and this usually under circumstances in which the revenue authorities are hard put to make ends meet.

Yet the United States must insist on some of these provisions. To give you only one example, the imposition of taxes on outgoing royalty payments is an obstacle to the free movement of technology to the underdeveloped country. To us the removal of such obstacles is the very purpose of our tax treaties. We have therefore felt that tax treaties with underdeveloped countries should contain provisions that brought about a substantial improvement in the climate for

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 9 (press release 454).

<sup>2</sup> For announcement of the signing, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1957, p. 172.



trade and investment even if these provisions called for a sacrifice of revenue. At the same time, we have not been able to overcome the understandable reluctance of the fiscal authorities of these countries to give up present revenue, unilaterally, for the somewhat intangible prospect of increased business activity.

This impasse has led to many proposals that we encourage foreign investment in underdeveloped countries by tax legislation rather than by tax treaty, and the Department of State is always prepared to study such proposals carefully. But there are certain features of the treaty approach that cannot be duplicated by legislation. In the field of taxation of private investment, in particular, what is needed is usually accommodation on both sides, not just on the U.S. side. Moreover, tax problems differ so widely from one country to the other that solutions have to be tailor-made through bilateral arrangements. Furthermore, tax problems are invariably complex, and for that reason alone tax treaties addressed to the whole range of tax relationships between two countries cannot be replaced by legislation. Rather than abandon the treaty approach in our relations with underdeveloped countries, we have sought a solution in the form of the tax-sparing provision that makes the treaty approach mutually acceptable.

We are satisfied that the tax-sparing provision in the Pakistan treaty is inherently reasonable, is in line with our treaty policy, and will accomplish our policy objectives. A few words about each one of these points will clarify our position.

Tax sparing is inherently reasonable. We should make it possible for underdeveloped countries to use tax incentives as a policy device for the encouragement of private investment in a given field. If an underdeveloped country wishes to attract domestic and foreign capital into new industries, tax incentives are clearly among the techniques which that country may explore. It is understandable that such a country would not take kindly to action by the United States that would take away the special benefit which it is granting to an industry or that would frustrate its policy.

Tax sparing is, further, an extension consistent with our treaty policy. Our basic principle of taxing all income of all United States nationals, residents, and corporations, no matter where such

income originates, requires modification at many points. Its main corrective is our policy of granting credit for foreign taxes—a policy by which we give foreign tax authorities a first claim on income arising under their jurisdiction. By the tax-sparing principle we concede to them the further power not only to tax but to forgo taxes.

Finally, tax sparing has already proved its value as a policy tool.

(1) The first concrete result of the tax-sparing policy announced by the administration 2 years ago is the treaty with Pakistan. We are actively engaged in tax-treaty negotiations with five Latin American countries. We hope to undertake tax-treaty negotiations with a large number of additional underdeveloped countries.

(2) The tax-sparing principle will improve our relations with many underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Latin America, because they consider tax sparing a significant step toward a reconciliation of their and our tax philosophies.

(3) The tax-sparing device, almost alone among measures for the encouragement of private investment, permits us to extend tax benefits selectively to areas and under conditions which will directly further our economic policy. It is in the underdeveloped areas that this device proves to be most useful, and it is our intention to negotiate tax-sparing provisions only after careful examination of the local tax concessions and the way they are administered.

(4) Tax sparing is geared directly to the economic-policy objectives of underdeveloped countries. It operates only if and when new industries are actually established. Thus the prospect of increased economic activity and the prospect of a broader tax base is tied directly to the temporary revenue concession offered. By enabling underdeveloped countries to use this tool as far as American investors are concerned, we can hope to open up a broader field for the private sector in general.

In conclusion, just a word about the Pakistan agreement as a whole. Our relations with Pakistan have long been friendly and close. We are allies under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and associated under the Baghdad Pact, and we are linked by a mutual security treaty. We view many of the great issues of the day in the

same  
supp  
agre  
such  
have  
Paki

Inte

Se  
by w  
vast  
raph  
prom  
lished  
and  
the s  
fleets

Th  
in hy  
For  
form  
Diffe  
the c  
and  
work  
Inter  
ingto  
mane  
posat  
tiona  
Peter  
War  
ther  
tion

Augu



same way. This fundamental accord can be supplemented and strengthened by a practical agreement in the sphere of business operations such as the double-tax treaty before you. We have an investment-guaranty agreement with Pakistan. We hope to have a treaty of friend-

ship, commerce, and navigation as well. The double-tax treaty with Pakistan is the first of its kind to be negotiated in this part of the world. It is a good, comprehensive treaty that should make a substantial contribution to a sound economic relationship between our two countries.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### International Cooperation in the Science of Hydrography

#### SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC CONFERENCE, MONTE CARLO, MONACO, MAY 7-17, 1957

*by William G. Watt*

Seventy percent of the earth's surface is covered by water. The science employed in charting this vast region for the benefit of mankind is hydrography. The various maritime nations in the promotion of their national interests have established hydrographic offices that conduct surveys and produce charts and nautical documents for the safe navigation of their navies and merchant fleets.

The need for formal international cooperation in hydrographic matters has long been recognized. For many years there was a great lack of uniformity in the products of the individual offices. Differences in form, procedure, symbols used, and the conflicting information found on the charts and in the publications seriously hampered the work of all hydrographic offices. In 1889 at an International Marine Conference held at Washington, D. C., it was proposed to establish a "permanent international commission." Similar proposals were made at the sessions of the International Congress of Navigation held at St. Petersburg in 1908 and again in 1912. World War I intervened and the lessons of that war further demonstrated the necessity for standardization on a worldwide basis. As a result, at the

invitation of the British Government, the first International Hydrographic Conference convened on June 24, 1919, at London, with 24 maritime nations in attendance.

The object of the Conference was clearly stated in the invitation to attend. It read: "To consider the advisability of all maritime nations adopting similar methods in the preparation, construction, and production of their charts and all hydrographic publications; of rendering the results in the most convenient form to enable them to be readily used; of instituting a prompt system of mutual exchange of hydrographic information between all countries, and of providing an opportunity for consultations and discussions to be carried out on hydrographic subjects generally by the hydrographic experts of the world."

• *Mr. Watt, author of the above article, is director of the Maritime Safety Division of the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office and was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Seventh International Hydrographic Conference.*

The major result of the Conference was the decision to establish a permanent International Hydrographic Bureau. The Principality of Monaco was selected as the seat of the Bureau because of its easy communication with the rest of the world, and more particularly because of the generous offer of Prince Albert I of Monaco to provide suitable accommodations for the Bureau in the Principality. The Bureau was established on June 21, 1921, and is now housed in its own headquarters built and maintained by the Government of Monaco.

The statutes governing the Bureau provide for the administration by a directing committee of three directors, each of a different nationality, elected to serve for a term of 5 years. These directors are required by the statutes to be "men of considerable sea experience and a great knowledge of practical hydrography." Provision is also made in the statutes for the election of a secretary general.

The United States has been actively interested in the success of the Bureau since it was first proposed, and Rear Adm. E. Simpson, U.S. Navy, the Hydrographer of the U.S. Navy in 1919, was a member of the committee named to create the Bureau and draw up its statutes. Since joining the Bureau in 1923, the United States has been represented continuously on the directing committee.

#### Objectives of Bureau

The principal objectives of the Bureau as stated in the statutes are as follows:

- (1) To establish a close and permanent association between services of its members.
- (2) To coordinate the hydrographic work of these services with a view to rendering navigation easier and safer in all the seas of the world.
- (3) To obtain uniformity as far as possible in charts and hydrographic documents.
- (4) To encourage the adoption of the best methods of carrying out hydrographic surveys.
- (5) To encourage improvement in the theory and practice of the science of hydrography.

The creation of the International Hydrographic Bureau came at a most opportune time, as it occurred at the beginning of an era when radical changes were about to be made in the then-existing methods of surveying and chart production.

Echo sounding, photogrammetry, electronic

positioning equipment, camera transits, and recording fathometers fitted to small boats, all resulted in more rapid and efficient surveys. Colors on charts and increased use of depth curves to bring out bottom configurations made charts clearer and easier to read. Increased topography became possible through photogrammetry, and new types of charts were developed for loran navigation. The declining use of engraved copper plates and the increased utilization of plastics in the production of charts revolutionized chart production in many hydrographic offices.

The principal work undertaken by the Bureau is:

- (1) Studying the charts and documents published by the world's hydrographic services.
- (2) Preparing and disseminating special publications of international hydrographic interest.
- (3) Studying methods of hydrographic surveying.
- (4) Studying methods employed for producing survey results for publications.
- (5) Studying the construction and use of hydrographic instruments and apparatus, the principles of which have been approved by any of the states that are members of the Bureau.
- (6) Collecting soundings from all sources and preparing and publishing the Bathymetric Chart of the World.

The work of the Bureau is published to its members in both English and French by means of routine correspondence and through the following media:

- (a) The Repertory of Technical Resolutions, containing all technical resolutions that have been adopted to date.
- (b) The International Hydrographic Review, issued twice yearly and carrying articles on hydrography and closely related subjects.
- (c) The International Hydrographic Bulletin, published monthly and containing information of current hydrographic interest.
- (d) Various special publications, including the Bathymetric Chart of the World.
- (e) Circular letters.
- (f) Annual reports.
- (g) Proceedings of the Conferences.

In order that the work of the Bureau may be reviewed and future plans developed, regular

conferences are held at 5-year intervals, attended by delegations from the member states, headed usually by the Hydrographer of each country.

#### **Work of Seventh Conference**

The Seventh International Hydrographic Conference convened at Monte Carlo May 7-17, 1957, and was attended by delegations from the following states: Argentina, Brazil, the British Commonwealth (Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand), Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. In addition, representatives from Belgium, the Dominican Republic, and the U. S. S. R. were in attendance as observers. Various international scientific organizations also sent observers. Member states unable to send delegates were: Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines.

The official U.S. delegation was headed by Rear Adm. Henry C. Daniel, Hydrographer of the U.S. Navy. Other members were: Rear Adm. Robert W. Knox, Assistant Director, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey; Capt. Samuel B. Grenell, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey; Guillermo Medina and William G. Watt of the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office; and Earl F. Brown, American Embassy, Paris.

The Conference was opened by Her Serene Highness Princess Antoinette of Monaco. Rear Adm. Chester L. Nichols, USN Retired, President of the Directing Committee, welcomed the delegates and reviewed the work and progress of the Bureau since the 1952 Conference.

Following the election of Dr. Gunther Bohncke, Director of the German Hydrographic Institute, as president of the Conference, the more than 80 proposals on the agenda were assigned to the committees, as provided for in the statutes, for study and report to the plenary sessions. These committees were: statutes, finance, charts, nautical documents, tides, work of the Bureau, eligibility of candidates, and a special committee on bathymetric charts.

As a result of committee work, a number of the proposals were withdrawn or referred to the member states for further study. At the plenary ses-

sions 65 proposals were adopted. These, when implemented, will further standardize and simplify international practices in hydrography.

In addition to the regular sessions of the Conference, a number of lectures were delivered by international authorities on hydrographic subjects. Some of the latest survey equipment was demonstrated at sea aboard the British survey vessel *H. M. S. Owens*.

Among the final acts of the Conference was the election of the directing committee for the next 5-year period. Rear Adm. Robert W. Knox of the United States was elected president, and Rear Adm. Alfredo Viglieri of Italy and Vice Adm. Leon Damiani of France were elected members of the directing committee. Admiral Knox retired as Assistant Director of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey on July 1, 1957, and will assume his new post in the fall.

The next International Hydrographic Conference is scheduled to convene at Monte Carlo on May 8, 1962.

#### **Mr. Southard To Be U.S. Executive Director of Monetary Fund**

The Senate on August 5 confirmed Frank A. Southard, Jr., to be United States Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund for a term of 2 years.

#### **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

##### **OAS Economic Conference**

The Department of State announced on August 6 (press release 449) that Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, will head the U.S. delegation to the Economic Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS), which is scheduled to convene at Buenos Aires, Argentina, on August 15, 1957. The Economic Conference will consider and discuss basic problems affecting the economies of the American Republics.

Alternate delegates will be Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, who will serve as vice chairman of the delegation, and Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Senator Homer E. Capehart, a member of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee on Banking and Currency, will serve as congressional adviser.

The remainder of the delegation is as follows:

*Senior Advisers*

Willard L. Beaulac, Ambassador of the United States to Argentina

Gabriel Hauge, Special Assistant to the President

Henry Kearns, Assistant Secretary of Commerce Designate

Rafael Picó, Secretary of the Treasury, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Harold M. Randall, Ambassador, Representative of the United States on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Samuel C. Waugh, President and Chairman of the Board, Export-Import Bank of Washington

*Advisers*

Elting Arnold, Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Treasury

Rollin S. Atwood, Regional Director for Latin America, International Cooperation Administration

Edward G. Cale, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, Buenos Aires

David L. Campa, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Jack C. Corbett, Director, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Department of State

James C. Corliss, Financial Adviser, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Hilary A. Driscoll, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires

Charles M. Elkinton, Agricultural Attaché, Rio de Janeiro

Nathan Gordon, Chief, International Tax Staff, Department of the Treasury

Charles R. Harley, Chief, Latin American Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Ralph V. Korp, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

John M. Leddy, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Charles A. Meyer, Vice President, Latin American Operations, Sears, Roebuck and Company

Clarence W. Nichols, Deputy Director, Office of International Resources, Department of State.

Robert A. Nichols, Agricultural Attaché, Buenos Aires

Charles P. Nolan, Commercial Attaché, Buenos Aires

Albert E. Pappano, Chief, Trade Agreements Branch, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State

Serafino Romualdi, The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

R. Henry Rowntree, Chief, Economic Division, Export-Import Bank of Washington

Terry B. Sanders, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of South American Affairs, Department of State

Walter Sauer, Executive Vice President, Export-Import Bank of Washington

Philip P. Williams, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

George H. Willis, Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce

*Special Assistant to the Delegate*

Nils A. Lennartson, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury

*Public Information Officers*

Richard I. Phillips, Regional Information Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Hoyt N. Ware, United States Information Service, Buenos Aires

*Secretary of Delegation*

Henry E. Allen, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

*Technical Secretary*

Earl H. Luboeansky, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State

Representatives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and other international organizations whose activities are related to topics on the agenda of the meeting will be observers at the conference.

## **Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography**

### **Security Council**

Letter Dated 15 May 1957 from the Representative of France Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3829, May 16, 1957. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 27 May 1957 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3833, May 28, 1957. 1 p. mimeo.

Report by the Acting Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Relating to the Demilitarized Zone Established Under Article V of the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. S/3844, July 1, 1957. 10 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 2 July 1957 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3846, July 2, 1957. 1 p. mimeo.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Thirty-one Nations Now Parties to International Motoring Treaty

by H. H. Kelly<sup>1</sup>

Recent advices from the United Nations indicate a marked increase in ratifications to the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949.<sup>2</sup> This basic worldwide agreement in the field of international motoring, which was developed shortly after World War II to facilitate the growing volume of automobile travel across national boundaries, has now been adhered to by 31 nations, 11 of which have deposited their accessions with the United Nations since January 1956. The treaty came into force in 1952. The United States in 1950 was the first government to ratify it.

Since the treaty provides for reciprocal recognition of automobile drivers' licenses and registration plates, together with other standardized requirements for international motoring, it constitutes one of the chief postwar measures for facilitating highway travel abroad. Under the terms of this treaty, a U.S. motorist may now drive his car in 30 foreign countries with essentially the same freedom of movement he enjoys among the various States of the Union. Reciprocally, foreign drivers may bring their cars to this country under similar conditions.

A noteworthy development occurred in July of this year when the United Kingdom and Peru deposited their instruments of accession. In the case of the United Kingdom the matter had been under careful ministerial and parliamentary study for some years, since it marked an innovation in longstanding British procedure, that is, the recognition of a foreign driver's license *per se*, without the requirement that he obtain a British driver's license. This difficulty has now been overcome, and effective August 7, 1957, the United Kingdom will recognize the valid driving

licenses of residents of other countries, for use with their own vehicles, hired vehicles, or vehicles purchased in the United Kingdom for subsequent export.

Peru is the first nation of South America to ratify the convention, the delayed action in that area having been due to the existence of a regional agreement on inter-American automotive traffic (1943), which will be superseded eventually by the improved 1949 instrument. All Latin American countries, as well as other countries throughout the world, are expected to become parties in due course to the 1949 convention.

As of July 1957, the following 31 nations have become parties to the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican City, Viet-Nam, and Yugoslavia.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957.

*Ratifications deposited:* Iceland, August 6, 1957; Indonesia, August 7, 1957; Hungary and Korea, August 8, 1957.

*Proclaimed by the President:* August 2, 1957.

#### Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic, with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

*Accession deposited:* Peru, July 9, 1957.

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Enters into force September 11, 1957.

*Proclaimed by the President:* August 2, 1957.

#### Customs Tariffs

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 (26 Stat. 1518), creating an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950.

*Notification of adherence given:* United States, August 7, 1957.

#### Duties and Rights of States

Protocol to the convention on duties and rights of states in the event of civil strife, signed at Habana February 20, 1928 (46 Stat. 2749). Opened for signature at the

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Kelly is director of the International Travel Division, U.S. Department of Commerce.

<sup>2</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2487. For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1949, p. 875a.

Pan American Union May 1, 1957.<sup>1</sup> Enters into force between states that ratify it in the order in which they deposit their instruments of ratification.

*Signatures:* Brazil and Costa Rica, May 1, 1957; Peru, June 18, 1957; United States, July 15, 1957.

### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Ireland, August 8, 1957.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington, December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Ireland, August 8, 1957.

### International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

*Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited:* Pakistan, May 23, 1957.<sup>2</sup> Effective until notice to terminate it is given.

### Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

*Notification by Portugal of extension to:* Portuguese overseas provinces of Cape Verde, Guinea, S. Tome and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, the State of India, Macao and Timor, effective February 23, 1957.<sup>3</sup>

### Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927 (TS 778).<sup>4</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Albania, July 2, 1957.

## BILATERAL

### Brazil

Agreement extending agreement for a cooperative program for reconnaissance of the uranium resources of Brazil of August 3, 1955 (TIAS 3385). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 5, 1957. Entered into force August 5, 1957.

### Canada

Protocol to the convention for the protection, preservation and extension of the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Fraser River system of May 26, 1930 (50 Stat. 1355). Signed at Ottawa December 28, 1956.

*Proclaimed by the President:* July 24, 1957.

### Germany

Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 3, 1957.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With conditions.

<sup>3</sup> Revision of item in BULLETIN of May 20, 1957, p. 829.

<sup>4</sup> As amended by the protocol opened for signature at New York December 7, 1953 (TIAS 3532).

*Entered into force:* August 7, 1957 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February 13, 1956. Entered into force April 23, 1956. TIAS 3543.

*Superseded:* August 7, 1957 (by agreement signed July 3, 1957).

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of February 13, 1956 (TIAS 3543). Signed at Washington June 29, 1956. Entered into force February 18, 1957. TIAS 3765.

*Superseded:* August 7, 1957 (by agreement signed July 3, 1957).

### Netherlands

Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1956.

*Entered into force:* August 8, 1957 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Agreement amending research and power reactor agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 22, 1956. Signed at Washington July 3, 1957.

*Entered into force:* August 8, 1957 (date on which each Government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Research reactor agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. TIAS 3461.

*Superseded:* August 8, 1957 (by agreement signed June 22, 1956).

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on August 5 confirmed the following:

H. Freeman Matthews to be Ambassador to Austria. (For biographic details, see press release 373 dated June 19.)

Walter C. Ploeser to be Ambassador to Paraguay. (For biographic details, see press release 418 dated July 11.)

### Designations

Stuart W. Rockwell as Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, effective August 11.

<b>American Republics. OAS Economic Conference</b> (delegation) . . . . .	363
<b>Argentina. Letters of Credence</b> (Yadarola) . . .	343
<b>Asia. Research Fellowships Offered Under SEATO</b> Cultural Program . . . . .	354
<b>Atomic Energy</b>	
Italy and World Bank To Sponsor Nuclear Power Study . . . . .	357
United States and Brazil Sign Power Reactor Agreement . . . . .	356
<b>Austria. Matthews confirmed as ambassador</b> . .	366
<b>Aviation. Air Agreement With Egypt Modified</b> . .	354
<b>Brazil. United States and Brazil Sign Power Re-</b> actor Agreement . . . . .	356
<b>Chile. President of Chile To Visit United States</b> .	343
<b>Congress, The</b>	
Department of State Supports Double-Tax Treaty With Pakistan (Kalijarvi) . . . . .	359
Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East (text of report) . . . . .	339
<b>Cuba. Secretary Dulles' News Conference of</b> August 6 . . . . .	344
<b>Department and Foreign Service</b>	
Confirmations (Matthews, Ploeser) . . . . .	366
Designations (Rockwell) . . . . .	366
<b>Disarmament. Secretary Dulles' News Conference</b> of August 6 . . . . .	344
<b>Economic Affairs</b>	
Department of State Supports Double-Tax Treaty With Pakistan (Kalijarvi) . . . . .	359
Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Butterfat Articles (text of proclamation) . . . . .	357
OAS Economic Conference (delegation) . . . . .	363
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of August 6 . .	344
Mr. Southard To Be U.S. Executive Director of Monetary Fund . . . . .	363
Thirty-one Nations Now Parties to International Motoring Treaty (Kelly) . . . . .	365
World Bank Loan to Japan for Aichi Irrigation Project . . . . .	355
<b>Educational Exchange. Research Fellowships Of-</b> fered Under SEATO Cultural Program . . . . .	354
<b>Egypt. Air Agreement With Egypt Modified</b> . .	354
<b>International Organizations and Conferences</b>	
International Cooperation in the Science of Hy- drography (Watt) . . . . .	361
OAS Economic Conference (delegation) . . . . .	363
Mr. Southard To Be U.S. Executive Director of Monetary Fund . . . . .	363
<b>Italy. Italy and World Bank To Sponsor Nuclear</b> Power Study . . . . .	357
<b>Japan</b>	
United States and Japan Establish Committee on Security . . . . .	350
World Bank Loan to Japan for Aichi Irrigation Project . . . . .	355
<b>Malaya. Mr. Herter and Ambassador Richards To</b> Attend Malayan Celebrations . . . . .	343
<b>Middle East</b>	
The Middle East: An American Point of View (Kretzmann) . . . . .	351

Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East (text of report) . . . . .	339
Secretary Dulles' News Conference of August 6 . .	344
<b>Mutual Security. Promoting Peace and Stability</b> in the Middle East (text of report) . . . . .	339
<b>Pakistan. Department of State Supports Double-</b> Tax Treaty With Pakistan (Kalijarvi) . . . . .	359
<b>Paraguay. Ploeser confirmed as ambassador</b> . .	366
<b>Presidential Documents</b>	
Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Butterfat Articles . . . . .	357
Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East .	339
<b>Science. International Cooperation in the Science</b> of Hydrography (Watt) . . . . .	361
<b>Treaty Information</b>	
Air Agreement With Egypt Modified . . . . .	354
Current Actions . . . . .	365
Department of State Supports Double-Tax Treaty With Pakistan (Kalijarvi) . . . . .	359
Thirty-one Nations Now Parties to International Motoring Treaty (Kelly) . . . . .	365
United States and Brazil Sign Power Reactor Agreement . . . . .	356
<b>United Nations. Current U.N. Documents</b> . . .	364

## Name Index

Dulles, Secretary . . . . .	344
Eisenhower, President . . . . .	339, 358
Herter, Christian A . . . . .	343
Ibañez del Campo, Carlos . . . . .	343
Kalijarvi, Thorsten V . . . . .	359
Kelly, H. H . . . . .	365
Kretzmann, Edwin M. J . . . . .	351
Matthews, H. Freeman . . . . .	366
Ploeser, Walter C . . . . .	366
Richards, James P . . . . .	343
Rockwell, Stuart W . . . . .	366
Southard, Frank A., Jr . . . . .	363
Watt, William G . . . . .	361
Yadarola, Mauricio Luis . . . . .	343

Check List of Department of State  
Press Releases: August 5-11

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press release issued prior to August 5 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 440 of July 31.

No.	Date	Subject
446	8/5	Argentina credentials (rewrite).
447	8/5	Modification of air transport agreement with Egypt.
448	8/6	SEATO research fellowships.
449	8/6	Delegation to OAS Economic Conference (rewrite).
450	8/6	Dulles: news conference.
451	8/7	Delegation to Malayan independence celebration (rewrite).
†452	8/7	Research and power agreement with Germany.
*453	8/7	Macomber nomination.
454	8/9	Kalijarvi: double-tax treaty with Pakistan.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



the  
Department  
of  
State

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
DIVISION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID  
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300  
(GPO)

*THE SECRETARIES OF STATE . . .*

Portraits and Biographical Sketches

This publication is based on a collection of portraits of Secretaries of State which the Department of State has been accumulating since 1861. It makes available for the first time reproductions of the portraits in this collection. The reproductions—which are in black and white—are arranged chronologically according to the terms of service of the Secretaries of State. Each reproduction is accompanied by a biographical sketch of the Secretary and by a note regarding the artist and the portrait.

The publication includes also three appendixes—the first relating to Secretaries of State ad interim, the second consisting of notes regarding other portraits belonging to the Department of State, and the third consisting of a chronological list of Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of State, and Secretaries of State ad interim.

*The Secretaries of State: Portraits and Biographical Sketches* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$1 a copy.

Publication 6402

\$1

*Order Form*

To: Supt. of Documents  
Govt. Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

Enclosed find:

\$ .....  
(cash, check, or  
money order).

Please send me ..... copies of *The Secretaries of State: Portraits and Biographical Sketches*.

Name: .....

Street Address: .....

City, Zone, and State: .....



VOID